Book Review: We Are Electric by Sally Adee, Allen&Unwin 2023

[Eddie]

Indeed, at least not until his last decade when he seems to have realised the inevitability of his 1905 thought really was inevitable.

It does seem like Einstein remained unconvinced that quantum mechanics was a complete theory even if it makes accurate predictions. He did explicitly state that God does not play dice. Perhaps he would be more convinced by one of deterministic quantum theories that exist today.

Leibniz is discussing these arguments in a different context from Einstein but he makes clear that, like Einstein, he understands that uncertainty is entailed by a theory that has intrinsic individuation of dynamic units ('atomism' or monadism). A true individual cannot cover all options. It has to do this or do that and a theory that tries to make that infinitely precise will fall foul of its own infinities.

I think infinities are an issue for indeterminism too. When an atom decays, it does so at a specific moment in time. However, if time is continuous then the moment of decay could never arrive without some reason for it to decay. It seems impossible for a random event to happen at a discrete time if there are also an infinite number of other times it could have occurred. Deterministic events don't appear to have this issue as one follows from another, so it is continuous in the same sense as time.

Well, if you accept that the equations of quantum theory are at least broadly valid then the partial randomness of all events is written right in to the theory.

It is my understanding that even this randomness can be explained if there is some statistical dependance with how measurements are made and the states of the particles. If every parameter was established at the big bang, then every particle already knows when it will be measured and how it will chose to appear when measured. It does not seem that superdeterminism is the most popular theory, however it seems to be rejected for its implications and seeming implausibility, not because the math isn't supportive.

 

[Jonathan Edwards]

Perhaps he would be more convinced by one of deterministic quantum theories that exist today.

I am not aware of any 'deterministic quantum theories' now available? Quantum theory has equations that give probabilities between 0 and 1 for every event so it is indeterministic in that sense.

However, it is true that 'deterministic' is a rather leading term. Leibniz considered that the history of this world was absolutely determined from creation in the sense that the future can never be what the future was going to be in our universe. But he points out that this is a truism and is compatible with the rules of possibility for any universe like ours being partly random. So it is not that we are uncertain that the future of this universe will be the one it will - we know that - it is that we must be uncertain exactly which universe we are in, until it has come to an end. This is a bit like Everett I guess.

But in practice what we mean by our physics being partly indeterministic is just this situation that Leibniz realised must apply.

I think infinities are an issue for indeterminism too. When an atom decays, it does so at a specific moment in time. However, if time is continuous then the moment of decay could never arrive without some reason for it to decay.

That doesn't raise infinities. It just means you have to use probabilities. It means that your equations will never give one absolute answer. But the math of quantum theory does that very neatly and the calculations are doable. There are issues with what is called renormalisation, but these turn out to be tractable. And running zillions of experiments has shown that the probability values predicted are accurate, as probabilities, to 18 decimal places.

The situation is certainly counterintuitive but Leibniz argues that our intuition simply cannot work in a mathematical theory without producing infinities that destroy the result at the limit. That is to say there must come a point where there is uncertainty, perhaps at a billionth of an inch - which of course quantum theory shows to be the case.

Probability theory handles infinities of options very nicely. Interestingly one of the other things Leibniz worked out was how much insurance premium people should need to pay in for a viable life insurance arrangement. He did not construct a formal probability theory but he was one of the first to use the math of probability in a practical way.

It is my understanding that even this randomness can be explained if there is some statistical dependance with how measurements are made and the states of the particles.

I don't follow that. Statistical dependence would be involving randomness surely? There have been suggestions that measuring conditions are somehow predetermined, I am aware. But the experiments using photons from distant galaxies seem to rule that out. (The measurements are 'chosen' by photons arriving from so far away no local correlation seems possible.)

It does not seem that superdeterminism is the most popular theory, however it seems to be rejected for its implications and seeming implausibility, not because the math isn't supportive.

I think there is some confusion over what is meant by 'superdeterminism'. I have had long conversations with physicists about this. If it means what Leibniz meant, that the future of our universe was always going to be what it will be, it is true by definition but does not stop the rules (for such universes) being truly partly random. Sabine Hossenfelder tries to grapple with this but I think she is still making the usual error in not treating time and space equivalently in terms of indivisibility within an excitation.

If you accept that every 'quantum' (field excitation) happens 'all of a piece' in time as well as space then the 'measurement problem' evaporates. The mistake is to stick to the idea that quanta 'progress through space' or 'move'. If they are seen simply as connections between spacetime locations of fields the answer to the superdeterminism issue is already dealt with. The creation an excitation occurs according to rules of probability given by quantum theory that involve and integration over a field domain extended both in space and 'forward' in time, as is clear from Feynman's simple account of QED. The field that throws up a photon in Andromeda already knows the absorbing conditions on earth when it 'calculates' the need to create such a photon. It is in the basic math of the theory. We didn't need the Aspect experiments to confirm that but people have such difficulty casting off intuitive realism (especially Einstein) that we went through that. And still people are puzzled when they don't need to be.

 

[Eddie]

I am not aware of any 'deterministic quantum theories' now available? Quantum theory has equations that give probabilities between 0 and 1 for every event so it is indeterministic in that sense.

However, it is true that 'deterministic' is a rather leading term. Leibniz considered that the history of this world was absolutely determined from creation in the sense that the future can never be what the future was going to be in our universe. But he points out that this is a truism and is compatible with the rules of possibility for any universe like ours being partly random. So it is not that we are uncertain that the future of this universe will be the one it will - we know that - it is that we must be uncertain exactly which universe we are in, until it has come to an end. This is a bit like Everett I guess.

Thank you for entertaining this discussion, there have been many interesting ideas.

I think I understand what you are saying here. The many worlds hypothesis would be deterministic in the sense that the probabilities are set in accordance to our pre-chosen world. While quantum events appear random to us, each quantum event already has an outcome as determined by which world we are in. However as we don't know which one of those worlds we are in, reality would still be indeterminate in some sense. Once it comes to an end we would know, but that still makes it unknowable at the time.

That doesn't raise infinities. It just means you have to use probabilities. It means that your equations will never give one absolute answer. But the math of quantum theory does that very neatly and the calculations are doable. There are issues with what is called renormalisation, but these turn out to be tractable. And running zillions of experiments has shown that the probability values predicted are accurate, as probabilities, to 18 decimal places.

The situation is certainly counterintuitive but Leibniz argues that our intuition simply cannot work in a mathematical theory without producing infinities that destroy the result at the limit. That is to say there must come a point where there is uncertainty, perhaps at a billionth of an inch - which of course quantum theory shows to be the case.

Probability theory handles infinities of options very nicely. Interestingly one of the other things Leibniz worked out was how much insurance premium people should need to pay in for a viable life insurance arrangement. He did not construct a formal probability theory but he was one of the first to use the math of probability in a practical way.

I think that probabilities are at the heart of this discussion. At a larger scale, probabilities are a tool to take our observations about the universe and predict complex outcomes with unknown variables. In the case of a coin flip, our experiments show that the event of heads and tails occur at the same rate. However, the coin's behavior is governed by equations that predict its movement though space. If we could know the force applied, the wind resistance, every variable that goes into its behavior then it would no longer be a 50/50. As we gather more information we would become more and more certain of one outcome over another approaching 100%.

If there really is a quantum point at which there is true uncertainty then I agree that it would be impossible to know all the variables and reach true certainty. But it seems so unintuitive that it makes me question probabilities, limits and other infinities are just mathematical tools used because we don't have a better theory of reality. It seems so absurd that something can happen without a reason. Determinism only really pushes that problem back to the big bang anyways so perhaps it isn't that crazy.

I don't follow that. Statistical dependence would be involving randomness surely? There have been suggestions that measuring conditions are somehow predetermined, I am aware. But the experiments using photons from distant galaxies seem to rule that out. (The measurements are 'chosen' by photons arriving from so far away no local correlation seems possible.)

My understanding is that all light cones must eventually overlap if we go back far enough. So even photons from distant galaxies were once locally correlated and retain that information in ways that are determined. Could it be that the reason the field threw up a photon in a distant galaxy is because far in the past those fields interacted in such a way that influenced both of them? In this case, the calculation of the emission of the photon had already been set by what would become the conditions on Earth. The field knows the conditions on Earth not because it checks when it does the calculation but because it knew the absorbing conditions when the field last interacted and so was always doing to act that way. I certainly still find it puzzling that two particles could instantly impact each other over an infinite distance, but I don't know the basic math so maybe understanding that would be compelling. What little I understand about this comes from Hossenfelder so I certainly won't argue for it more connivingly than she could.

 

[Jonathan Edwards]

While quantum events appear random to us, each quantum event already has an outcome as determined by which world we are in.

Yes, that is roughly it. In the Everett inspired many worlds theory worlds are constantly splitting into an infinite number of options. That seems to me a silly way of thinking about it, even if it sort of does the same job. Leibniz's idea is simpler. In our universe the future is what it was going to be and no splitting. We just cannot tell from observing events and generalising which ours is.

As we gather more information we would become more and more certain of one outcome over another approaching 100%.

That applies to one or a few ordered solid structures. But as soon as you get to liquids the presence of maybe 10,00000000000000000000000 fundamental events per second in a teaspoonful all suffering from Einstein's randomness worry things are not so easy. An important property of cells is that they can offset this by making use of semi-crystalline ordered solid elements interacting with fluid phase. Things get complicated but it may be that it sonly really in this special context that one could get anything approximating to our rich experience being used for reliable action.

But it seems so unintuitive that it makes me question probabilities, limits and other infinities are just mathematical tools used because we don't have a better theory of reality.

That was Einstein view until old age. But Leibniz took the Sherlock Holmes approach -“When you have eliminated the impossible, whatever remains, however improbable, must be the truth”. And given that our understanding of the world can only draw on unreliable internal brain images and mathematical structure, which seems rather reliable I think it is fair to bet that our intuitions based on the images are the dodgy bit. We think things move but it is now pretty clear that there is no such thing as movement. And we know that the way the brain represents movement is a con trick.

Could it be that the reason the field threw up a photon in a distant galaxy is because far in the past those fields interacted in such a way that influenced both of them?

Quantum theory fairly clearly says not. But quantum theory very much allows the photon being emitted in Andromeda to arise as a response to a field domain that includes all the times and places all the way to earth and also the orientation of the measuring device that captures it. I look at it like a chess game. Each photon is a move. A move occurs because the celestial chess player can see the whole board and whether or not there is a bishop on the square where the knight will land and also whether there is also a pawn that could take the knight if it took the bishop and so on. The 'mystery' of quantum theory is that causation 'reaches out across time this way. That is not the spooky action at a distance that Einstein raised but it solves the same problem.

In the EPR type experiment it is not that the measurement of one photon sends a faster than light message to the other one to get itself at the right angle. The two photons are a single forked event that arises as that event because both measuring devices are there in a particular orientation to receive them. The sending faster than light idea cannot work not just because relativity does not allow things that fast but more seriously because there is no fact of the matter which measurement is first. But relativity puts no restrictions on photon pairs arising informed by two places 100 light years away.

 

[Jonathan Edwards]

What little I understand about this comes from Hossenfelder so I certainly won't argue for it more connivingly than she could.

Sabine is very engaging and good at putting the paradoxes as seen by the brand popular science community. But I think, like that community, she misses the fact that you treat relativistic quantum theory really seriously the problem solves itself but at the cost of, as you say, serious damage to intuition. I learnt my quantum theory from Michael Ellis Fisher and from Feynman's lecture books. Michael led me to see that the popular problem isn't really there.

 

[poetinsf]

But if you damage connections from visual cortex to other areas you are more likely not to be aware that anything is missing.

Missing experience aka qualia is what I was aiming for. There are reports from stroke victims, with damage to portion that encode the notion of self for example, not being able to perceive the boundary between her hand and the rest of the world even though she sees perfectly. Her experience, at least a part of it, was missing even though her input signals to her brain remain perfect.

When I brought up lobotomy, I was thinking something like verbal brain on the left and emotional brain on the right. The right visual field would trigger verbal portion, but not emotional one. If he sees the sunset in the right field, will that trigger the sense of awe? He might describe the sunset but probably won't be able to feel the same emotion of awe.

Moreover, there are a lot of serious problems with interpretation of reported experience

But that is what we are talking about, the reported, subjective experience known as qualia. If they report difference experience when connections are severed, then it is a different experience.

 

[Jonathan Edwards]

I have lost the plot of what you are trying to argue ion the last post @poetinsf .

I have been saying that qualia are encoded in inputs to certain cells somewhere deepen the brain but a location not yet known. I assume that there will be millions of cells getting this sort of input so they may be spread over very large areas of cortex or thalamus. I bamnot equating qualia with input to sense organs - we know that we do not report inputs at that level, we only report inputs from cells that have collated and differentiated inputs from sense organs.

 

[poetinsf]

Yes, but you are always predicting experiences. Think about it. That is just brute fact.

Again, sounds like you are calling quantitative information qualia. We definitely have a problem of definition. Qualia as I understand it, from Wikipedia: In philosophy of mind, qualia are defined as instances of subjective, conscious experience.

 

[poetinsf]

People say, oh well physical events outside are made of real stuff rather than just phantasms. But what we mean by the physical realness of 'real stuff' turns out to be just the qualia our brains paint their representations in. The more we thin of things as really physical the more we are invoking qualia.

OK, at least we seem to agree that there is only model, and no such a thing as reality that model stand for. We still disagree what "qualia" is. It is an illusion as long as it means subjective experiences such as pain or joy.

 

[Jonathan Edwards]

Qualia as I understand it, from Wikipedia: In philosophy of mind, qualia are defined as instances of subjective, conscious experience.

Right, and all quantitative information is known to us in qualia terms. If I read 7.3 on my pressure gauge that 7.3 is known to me through qualia of patterns of black and white and also conceptual meaning, which may be outside the popular definition of qualia but is still subjective conscious experience.

We have got vey good at creating instruments like rulers and gauges that we have found reliably give us the same qualia in similar situations and give other people co-varying qualia that we can agree on with a standard language of maths.

What we call physics and find in physics textbooks is almost entirely concerned with rules of causal connection for chains of distal events that ultimately give us qualia. But in biomedical science biophysics extends things into consideration of internal events and how variations, as in clinical states, affect the qualia more proximally. There is a discipline of 'psychophysics', although I bamnot sure the term is very useful. The people who invented physics, like Newton and Descartes, were well aware that these are just two different aspects of our enquiry into what goes on in the world.

 

[poetinsf]

I have been saying that qualia are encoded in inputs to certain cells somewhere deepen the brain but a location not yet known.

OK, maybe we've been talking over each other's head then. I thought you meant sensory input. We are in agreement!

 

[Jonathan Edwards]

OK, at least we seem to agree that there is only model, and no such a thing as reality that model stand for. We still disagree what "qualia" is. It is an illusion as long as it means subjective experiences such as pain or joy.

I am quite sure there is reality, but we can only know it and describe it in terms of maths and our internal representational language.

Why would qualia be illusory though? It would only be illusory if it was in some way wrong about the true nature of reality. But just being a representation it isn't necessarily wrong or right. And if all we have are these qualia models then presumably the exist, so are not illusions? I don't follow your usage of terms.

 

[poetinsf]

I am quite sure there is reality, but we can only know it and describe it in terms of maths and our internal representational language.

Depending on what you mean by "know". I'm fond of saying that reality is my religion and science is my doctrine. But I can't prove that the "reality" exists and neither can you. It may not matter at the end though. The sensory realm that we are in is the reality that we live in, whether it is the "reality" or some simulation or something else. It's sort of like "I think, therefore I am", or "I can predict, therefore the reality is".

Why would qualia be illusory though? It would only be illusory if it was in some way wrong about the true nature of reality.

Again, depending on what you mean by "true nature". I maintain that there is no such a thing as true nature (or self-nature in Buddhist term) or reality. Things like qualia or self are illusions created by evolution, either expressly or as byproduct, to preserve self. And I'm calling the subjective sensation of qualia an illusion in particular, because it is no more than sensory input pushing buttons and pulling strings deep inside of our brain. It's not an independent entity that exists by itself, in other words.