Andy
Retired committee member
Highlights
• Diagnosis is medicine’s classification tool; it is fundamental in determining treatment and prognosis, in allocating resources, and in legitimising illness.
• Some clinical cases are medically unexplained, and present a problematic situation for a medicine which defines itself by its diagnostic paradigm.
• The contemporary practice of referring to the undiagnosable condition as “diagnostic uncertainty” is a form of epistemic defence.
• Positioning the problem as one of individual cognition rather than with the diagnostic system itself protects the system.
• By shedding light on how groups deal with the failure of their systems and the limitation of their knowledge, we learn more about their paradigms, practices and politics.
Abstract
One common contemporary usage of the term “diagnostic uncertainty” is to refer to cases for which a diagnosis is not, or cannot, be applied to the presenting case. This is a paradoxical usage, as the absence of diagnosis is often as close to a certainty as can be a human judgement. What makes this sociologically interesting is that it represents an “epistemic defence,” or a means of accounting for a failure of medicine’s explanatory system. This system is based on diagnosis, or the classification of individual complaints into recognizable diagnostic categories. Diagnosis is pivotal to medicine’s epistemic setting, for it purports to explain illness via diagnosis, and yet is not always able to do so. This essay reviews this paradoxical use, and juxtaposes it to historical explanations for non-diagnosable illnesses. It demonstrates how representing non-diagnosis as uncertainty protects the epistemic setting by positioning the failure to locate a diagnosis in the individual, rather than in the medical paradigm.
Paywall, https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0160932721000193
• Diagnosis is medicine’s classification tool; it is fundamental in determining treatment and prognosis, in allocating resources, and in legitimising illness.
• Some clinical cases are medically unexplained, and present a problematic situation for a medicine which defines itself by its diagnostic paradigm.
• The contemporary practice of referring to the undiagnosable condition as “diagnostic uncertainty” is a form of epistemic defence.
• Positioning the problem as one of individual cognition rather than with the diagnostic system itself protects the system.
• By shedding light on how groups deal with the failure of their systems and the limitation of their knowledge, we learn more about their paradigms, practices and politics.
Abstract
One common contemporary usage of the term “diagnostic uncertainty” is to refer to cases for which a diagnosis is not, or cannot, be applied to the presenting case. This is a paradoxical usage, as the absence of diagnosis is often as close to a certainty as can be a human judgement. What makes this sociologically interesting is that it represents an “epistemic defence,” or a means of accounting for a failure of medicine’s explanatory system. This system is based on diagnosis, or the classification of individual complaints into recognizable diagnostic categories. Diagnosis is pivotal to medicine’s epistemic setting, for it purports to explain illness via diagnosis, and yet is not always able to do so. This essay reviews this paradoxical use, and juxtaposes it to historical explanations for non-diagnosable illnesses. It demonstrates how representing non-diagnosis as uncertainty protects the epistemic setting by positioning the failure to locate a diagnosis in the individual, rather than in the medical paradigm.
Paywall, https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0160932721000193