Woolie
Senior Member
Loved the opening para:
And this line, so true - look at the authors in that reference!
And this one:
Biomedical diagnostic science is a great deal less successful than we’ve been willing to acknowledge in bioethics. While the foundations of clinical ethics have been centered on a model of medical practice involving established biological diagnosis, in truth that model applies only in a portion of cases. Are current bioethical tools adequate for addressing the ethical complexities that arise in cases of medically unexplained symptoms?
And this line, so true - look at the authors in that reference!
For example, as explained in “The Function of ‘Functional,” etiologically ambiguous terms for psychogenic diagnosis “conceal some of the conflict in a particularly contentious area,” offering the “advantage” of “allowing neurologists to use the same term to mean one thing to colleagues and another to patients” (Kanaan, Wessely, and Armstrong 2012, 250).
Moreover, when studies do set out to determine error rates for psychogenic diagnosis (de Gusmao et al. 2014; Schuepbach, Adler, and Sabbioni 2002; Skovenborg and Shroder 2014), they generally adopt the strategy of following up to determine how often patients with psychogenic diagnosis “are subsequently given a disease diagnosis that, in hindsight, explained their original symptoms” (Stone et al. 2005, 989)—a process that might tell us a great deal about doctors’ reluctance to overturn a psychogenic diagnosis, and nothing at all about the actual rate of error.
And this one:
But this is the borderland between medicine and psychiatry, and in this area we should be suspicious of our willingness to allow popular ideas about “mind–body integration” to substitute for serious, well-defended philosophical reasoning