Introduction and Overview (00:00–01:01)
David Tuller introduces Brian Hughes, a psychologist from the University of Galway, and his new book Psychology’s Quiet Conservatism. Hughes explains that the book explores how psychology, despite being labeled a liberal or “woke” field, actually promotes a socially conservative worldview. Its theories and methods, he argues, downplay inequality, discourage dissent, and reinforce existing social structures.
The Individual-Centered Bias of Psychology (01:38–03:43)
Hughes describes psychology as “individualcentric,” focusing on personal rather than systemic explanations for human problems. This approach erases social, political, and economic contexts, encouraging individuals to solve structural problems by changing themselves. Even seemingly progressive movements like humanistic psychology are deeply individualistic, emphasizing self-actualization and personal growth instead of collective change. Such an approach, Hughes says, blames individuals for hardship and maintains unjust social conditions.
Industrialization and the Birth of Productivity Norms (04:24–05:49)
Hughes connects psychology’s conservatism to the Industrial Revolution, which redefined human worth in terms of economic productivity. Before industrialization, communities accommodated diverse people, but industrial norms excluded those deemed “unfit for modernity.” This perspective—what theorists call “capitalist realism”—frames disability as economic non-productivity, a concept psychology has largely accepted rather than questioned.
The Political Center and the Marginalized (06:01–07:00)
Even political movements on the traditional left, Hughes argues, often reinforce conservative ideas by focusing on “working people,” implying that non-working or disabled people are less valuable. Thus, much of modern political discourse, including the moderate left, remains right-of-center by historical standards.
Psychology, Disability, and Psychogenic Illness (07:01–09:25)
Turning to ME/CFS and long COVID, Tuller and Hughes discuss how psychology’s worldview supports psychogenic explanations—the idea that unexplained illnesses are psychological. Hughes argues that this reflects political and economic motives, as classifying illnesses as psychological reduces welfare and healthcare costs. Psychologists and psychiatrists have historically contributed to this framing, aligning with policymakers seeking to limit disability spending.
Institutional Symbiosis and Power Structures (09:28–11:46)
Tuller notes the close ties between researchers promoting psychogenic models and policymakers in government or insurance sectors. Hughes agrees, adding that psychology’s focus on the individual makes it appealing to bureaucracies, as it avoids examining power and privilege. Disciplines like sociology or anthropology, which do address structural inequalities, receive less funding and prestige.
Conservatism in Practice and Resistance to Change (12:12–14:42)
The discussion turns to the UK’s NICE guidelines on ME/CFS, where psychologists resisted removing CBT as a standard treatment. Hughes sees this as an example of bureaucratic conservatism—professionals defending existing systems because their livelihoods and authority depend on them. This resistance, he says, is “the very essence of conservatism”: preserving structures simply because they exist.
Rethinking Psychology’s Role (14:43–16:52)
Asked how to promote change, Hughes suggests greater humility within psychology. He advocates for transparent, evidence-based regulatory systems like NICE that operate outside the discipline’s internal biases. Psychologists, he concludes, should recognize the limits of their field, abandon the idea that psychology can solve all problems, and re-evaluate their role within broader social systems.
Closing (16:54–17:02)
Tuller thanks Hughes for the discussion, calling it insightful. Hughes expresses his appreciation for the opportunity to talk about his work.
