Page two of the slide presentations issued to us on Friday;
What does the scope do?
- Ensures the guideline addresses the key areas of variation in delivery of care and quality
How on earth can this be achieved? There appears no formal mechanism for feedback to NICE about "variation", care or quality!!.
NHS England and NHS Public Health have not addressed this.
Government (D o H and SC) don't collect data on ME CFS Services-
Not all services subscribe to "BACME"-
One of the informed stakeholders involve in NICE before and with BACME (medic) gave out some statistics which are not common knowledge (only 9% of services have a lead ( consultant level?) physician) , most are therapy OT and Physio led; annual average "spend" on a MS patient £80, and ME patient averaged at £4 I think she said (will have to check).
I suggested "Counting the Cost" Report could help inform?
http://2020health.org/2020health/Publications/Publications-2017/OHC.html
Also the APPG Inquiry (aborted) on Barriers to Access of Social Care.
She was pressing for some "outcome measures".....to guide the debate and NICE- If she meant "Friends and Family Test, (F&FT) ", forget it!
We pressing for some robust Key Performance Indicators for our area but the KPIs suggested we were told were too demanding (ie too revealing).
But even our statistical analysis of the F& FT revealed a worrying decline and reduced satisfaction year on year.
More worrying was the failure to deliver contactual obligations and that was not just waiting times.....with absolutely no consequences for the offending service from the commissioning teams.
Care Quality Commission deliberately ignored complaints too and refused to look at inspection.
So, when this came up today, I thought back to Friday.........
http://healthinsightuk.org/2018/05/28/qof-fiasco-2-immoral-refusal-to-learn-from-mistakes/
QOF Fiasco 2: ’Immoral’ refusal to learn from mistakes
By Jerome Burne
Last week I wrote about the great QOF (Quality and Outcomes Framework) fiasco – the 30-billion-pound public health experiment involving the whole UK population without any kind of testing or pilot programs and without telling patients (in any formal sense) what was going on. Ten years after its launch it was clear that it had almost totally failed. Yet
almost no one outside the profession knew about it.
Given its potential impact on our health, this seemed a major scandal that warranted rapid action and proper investigation. This week’s post is about the medical establishment’s remarkable ability to ignore the implications and refusal to do anything about it at all. This failure to even attempt to learn any lessons from it has been described by one professor of public health as a ‘frankly immoral way to conduct policy.’
The policy wasn’t specifically kept secret but the key part of the program – paying GPs for testing for certain health biomarkers and then for prescribing various drugs if they fell above or below them – came as shocking or surprising news to those who did accidently learn about it. That accounted for half the cost, the other half went to pay for the increase in drug prescriptions.